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Abstract
Much of the attention on the economic aspects of the forthcoming enlargement of the EU
have concentrated upon the high-profile issues which are linked to the level of relative
economic development in the acceding countries; the perceived threat of large-scale migration
and the budgetary costs arising from implementation of EU agricultural and regional policies.
This paper briefly discusses that these are not insurmountable problems and stresses that the
main difficulties from the next enlargement may arise from the effective inclusion of the
acceding countries into the Single Market, the microeconomic hub of the EU. We discuss that
the process of regulatory harmonisation will become more difficult in an EU of 25
or more members, which entails greater emphasis on the principle of mutual recognition as
the main tool for ensuring freedom of movement of goods and services. However, mutual
recognition has its limits and is likely to be less effective the more diverse the countries
involved.
                                       
* Paul Brenton is a Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. He expresses his gratitude to Jacques Pelkmans for helpful
comments.1
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Introduction
The European Union is on the eve of a new enterprise. After the launch of the Euro, it is now
time for shifting the Union’s border to the East. The challenge facing the Union with the start
of the eastern enlargement, the first wave of which should be decided at the end of 2002 and
implemented during 2004-2006, cannot be underestimated. A region of about 100 million
inhabitants will be integrated into the EU, but, given the existing income gap between the two
halves of Europe, the Union’s GDP will increase by only 5% after enlargement. Populations
deeply rooted in European history will become again part of the continental polis, yet these
same populations emerged from almost half a century of Soviet domination and planned
economy only just over ten years ago. A complex net of similarities and differences make the
eastern enlargement something quite different compared to previous episodes of EU
expansion.
There are four key differences between this and previous enlargements that have an important
bearing upon the way in which the economic impact of the next enlargement should be
analysed:
The level of income in many of the applicant countries is considerably lower than that of
existing members.
The applicants are in the process of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy.
Much of the analysis of the impact of enlargement depends upon assessments (and
assumptions) of the extent to which this process has been completed.
The volume of EU legislation that the new members are having to adopt is far more extensive
than in previous enlargements primarily due to the creation and enhancement of the Single
Market.
The extent of pre-accession integration is already substantial due to the provisions of the
Europe Agreements which have not only led to the removal of tariffs and other border policies
on industrial products but have provided for the adoption of a large number of EU regulations
prior to enlargement. This entails that many of the benefits of enlargement are already being
enjoyed (and that many of the economic costs arising from adjustment to the enlargement
situation have already been borne).
The first point relates to the relative level of economic development in the applicant countries.
The second point is a reflection of the particular historical circumstances of these countries.
The second, third and fourth features are very much linked to the necessary conditions for
successful integration into the EU and the steps that have been taken to meet thosePAUL BRENTON
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requirements. The Copenhagen criteria stipulated by the European Council encapsulates the
importance of the transition process by requiring that new members must have:
•  A functioning market economy;
•  The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU;
•  The ability to take on all the obligations of membership.
These requirements all relate to the issue of the transition to a market economy and are not
related to the level of income in the applicant countries. The EU does not place any conditions
on applicants concerning the level of economic development. However, the level of economic
development lies at the heart of the high profile enlargement issues which have received most
attention from policy makers and the media; migration, agriculture, the structural funds and
budgetary issues. We will briefly review existing studies of these issues and analyse the
extent, and the ways in which, these will cause problems in the enlarged EU. Careful
analytical work shows that all of these issues are more than manageable in an enlarged EU
and should not cause substantial economic problems to the Union as a whole. Difficulties
arise because impacts are concentrated on particular members, creating political problems.
Our attention in this paper then turns to a more detailed consideration of the issue of the
transition and enlargement. Given their different levels of income do the applicant countries
have economic and institutional structures, which will allow them to effectively participate in
the European Union and contribute to the policies and objectives of the Union? The criterion
of a functioning market economy and the ability to withstand competition are amenable to
relatively objective assessment, which indeed has been the aim of the Commission’s regular
opinions on the applicant countries. The third criteria, the ability to take on the obligations of
membership, is however, more difficult to define and assess. This reflects in part that,
although the pre-accession period has seen a tremendous effort by the applicant countries to
adopt EU legislation, there are a number of key policies the nature of whose implementation
will only become apparent after enlargement. Nevertheless, it is opportune now to consider
potential problems that may arise and the implications of these for the enlarged Union.
Here we focus on whether the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries will
have an important impact on the coherence of the Single Market and whether it will
undermine or contribute to the objective defined by the Lisbon council of making the EU the
most competitive and cohesive place in the world to live and to do business. We concentrate
especially on the difficulties that may arise with regard to product regulations and technical
barriers to trade, a key element of the Single Market. Finally, having discussed the potential
economic problems that may arise from the next enlargement over the next 10 years or so we
then briefly discuss what comes next. Is there scope for further integration in Europe and an
intensification of economic ties between perhaps 25 EU members and to what extent will
enlargement constrain or facilitate any further deepening of integration in Europe.
Enlargement and the Level of Income in the Applicant Countries
The last two enlargements were, first, to the South, and then, to the North. The accession of
Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s brought relatively low-income partners in the Union,
and this changed the economic geography and the budgetary structure of the EU. However,
both the population dimension and the average income gap of the countries then involved in
the southern enlargement were about half those relating to the current candidate countries.
The Northern Enlargement of the 1990s actually raised the average per capita income of theTHE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
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EU, and the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden brought a net positive contribution to
the Union’s budget.
This time the picture is completely different. The incoming members of the EU are, and will
be for quite a few years, significantly poorer than the existing members. Their average wages
are lower than in the incumbents; hence there could be an incentive for workers to move
westward, and for capital to go eastward. Their core inflation rates will be higher due to
structural transformation and their net contribution to the EU budget will be persistently
negative. Of course, all this will impact on a number of EU policies and institutions, in the
fields of migration and border flows, financial and budgetary provisions, monetary policy and
the working of the ECB and trade and investment flows. Here we consider the key
microeconomic policies relating to agriculture, migration and structural funds expenditures
and bring the analysis together to consider implications for the EU budget.
Migration
This is perhaps the most widely discussed of the perceived problems of enlargement but
which in practice is likely to be of minor significance for the Union as a whole. Migration is
seen to be an important problem because the very large income gap and the relative proximity
of the applicant countries appear to convinced many of the scope for substantial flows of
workers from the east to the west of Europe. Nevertheless, the consensus from economic
studies, which take a more considered view of the factors leading to migration, is that
enlargement is unlikely to have a serious impact upon jobs and wages in the EU as a whole.
CEC (2001) estimate that the cumulative net inflow of migrants from the east will amount to
less than one per cent of the working population of the EU 15 in 2009, such flows cannot be
expected to have a major impact on the EU as a whole. It is worth noting that as economic
integration between the EU and the  CEECs intensified during the 1990s the number of
migrants from the east declined. According to the University of Kent, while 330,000 moved to
the EU in 1990, by 1997 the total was less than 14,000.
1
Although, the aggregate effects will be small they will be concentrated on particular countries
and regions, especially, Germany and Austria. Thus, for example, in 1998 for the EU as a
whole, (legal) immigrant workers from the  CEECs accounted for 0.2% of total EU
employment. However, around 80% of such migrants reside in Germany and Austria,
accounting for 0.5% and 1.1% respectively of national labour forces, with even higher
concentrations in particular regions (CEC (2001)). This is the problem that is faced by the EU,
how to adjust to regionally concentrated problems to maintain general support for the
enlargement. This is politically difficult but feasible to solve and has so far been addressed in
terms of transition periods during which the completely free movement of labour will remain
suspended to allow the receiving regions time to adjust.
Agriculture, Structural Funds and the Budget
The other issue that has received much attention is the financing of the next enlargement.
Agriculture raises its head as a prominent issue, not only because it is one of the main policies
of the EU in budgetary terms, accounting for around 40% of EU expenditures, but also
because in many of the applicant countries, reflecting low levels of income, agriculture
remains a major sector, at least in terms of employment. Similarly, transfers under the
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structural funds will be an important element in promoting cohesion with the new members
states but imply substantial transfers given the low levels of income in the East.
A major concern is whether the enlargement will place undue budgetary pressures on the
existing members who will have to finance transfers to the East via the CAP and the structural
funds. Numerous estimates exist of the cost of extending to the new member states these two
EU policies. A number of recent studies converge on figures of around €10 billion annually
for the cost of extending the CAP to the first wave of eight candidates from Central and
Eastern Europe. The Berlin Council decided that the absorption capacity of the structural
funds should be 4% of GDP for the Central and Eastern European members. Allowing for
their contributions to the EU budget, the net transfers that the new member states can expect
under the current rules would be about 3% of their GDP, which entails a transfer under the
structural funds of below 10 billion Euro.
Therefore, following  Gros (2001) a rough rule of thumb would be that enlargement could
imply a net transfer to the East (from the current EU-15) of about €20 billion. This represents
about 0.3% of the GDP of the EU-15, or less than one per cent of total public expenditure in
the EU-15. Enlargement will thus not bankrupt any government. Nor will enlargement blow
the ceiling on the EU budget, which has been set at 1.27% of GDP (equivalent to about €100
billion given a GDP of the EU-15 of around €8000 billion). As the EU is currently spending
only around €80 billion it would be possible to accommodate an increase of about €20 billion
without breaching this ceiling. All in all it thus appears that enlargement should not put an
unbearable strain on the EU budget. The problem will be who will pay for the enlargement.
At present this has not been resolved and remains the real issue with regard to the budgetary
cost of enlargement.
The main problem with regard to agriculture is that enlargement makes an ill-designed policy
even more unsustainable in the light of global trade commitments and the desire to conclude a
new trade round, following increasing demands from consumers for a change in the nature of
agricultural production and the increasing emphasis on environmental sustainability and rural
development. Enlargement has not created any of these issues but does add to them and
increases the imperative to reform and redesign the CAP to effectively meet modern and
achievable targets for the agricultural sector in conjunction with other European and global
policy objectives.
To conclude, the next enlargement requires the inclusion of a large number of relatively low-
income countries into the Union. Since the two key policies of the Union involve transfers
which are either directly or indirectly linked to the level of income and economic
development this entails a substantial increase in demands upon the EU budget. However,
under plausible scenarios it does not appear that these demands will undermine the EU
budget. The difficult issue is upon whom will the burden of funding enlargement fall.
Similarly, with regard to migration, the impact for the EU as a whole is unlikely to cause
substantial problems. However, the impact will be concentrated upon particular countries and
regions. So, these income-related problems related to enlargement are not insurmountable.
However, the pre-occupation with the financial costs of enlargement and the ill-perceived
threat of mass-migration has led to other potential problems related to the next enlargement
being overlooked. We now proceed to suggest that paramount among these is consideration of
how the new members will affect the day to day operation of key elements of the Union, and
in particular, the Single Market.THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
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Enlargement and the Cohesion of the Single Market
Many of the direct economic benefits of EU membership, in terms of enhanced trade and
investment relations, have already been reaped. This reflects that a range of barriers to trade
and investment between the EU and applicant countries has already been removed in the
context of the free trade (Europe) agreements that were signed in the early and mid-1990s.
Formal trade barriers (tariffs and quantitative restrictions) in the EU to imports of industrial
products from the CEECs have now been completely dismantled. A similar situation exists in
all the applicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Agriculture, as always, is a notable
exception, where trade restrictions will remain until the date of enlargement. As Brenton and
Manzocchi (2002) argue to all intents and purposes the transition with regard to trade and
investment is over in those countries that will shortly join the EU. If one examines the trade
and foreign investment features of these countries in ignorance of history then there is nothing
that identifies them as being different from market economies.
With trade between the EU and the applicants largely free of formal trade barriers and
adjustment to this policy environment already completed the economic impact of the next
enlargement of the EU revolves around participation in the Single Market of the EU. The key
feature of the Single Market is its attention to non-border regulatory policies which, although
not necessarily their primary intent, may act as a substantial impediment to trade. For trade in
goods the principal issue, and the main remaining obstacles to trade, are technical barriers,
which arise from the implementation of regulatory policies by governments, concerning for
example, safety and health issues and from voluntary standards adopted by domestic
industries. Similarly for services the key issues relate to differences in regulatory regimes
across countries which constrain the ability of firms to effectively operate on a European-wide
basis.
In this section we examine the possible impact of the accession of the Central and Eastern
European Countries on the operation of the Single Market. Since the implementation of
regulatory policies lie at the heart of the Single Market effective participation requires a
certain level of suitable infrastructure and administrative and legal capacity to implement the
range of regulatory instruments that are necessary to support markets for goods and services.
In terms of the next enlargement and the effective operation of the Single Market, this is the
key dimension of the transition that needs to be addressed. To what extent will the application
of regulatory policies in the enlarged Union act to segment markets and constrain and
compromise the level of economic integration that has been achieved between the current
members?
The Single Market is the microeconomic core of the Union, if the enlargement were to
seriously undermine or weaken the Single Market then this would constitute a substantial, but
unquantifiable, cost of enlargement. At the same time the EU is placing greater emphasis on
enhancing the Single Market and increasing further the degree of integration in Europe. A
completely integrated market is seen as essential in enhancing the competitiveness of the EU
relative to the US. We now proceed to describe the key mechanisms by which the EU has
sought to create a Single Market and then briefly examine why there is a belief that the Single
Market programme can be more effectively implemented. In the next section we consider
some of the broad implications of enlargement for the Single Market and then assess to what
extent the objective of achieving perfectly integrated markets for goods, services and capital
in Europe can actually be met.PAUL BRENTON
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The Single Market and Trade in Goods
The awareness that differences in national regulations and their application could be an
important barrier to economic integration has been an important part of EU policy since the
inception of the EEC in the 1950s with even greater emphasis having been given to this issue
under the Single Market programme. The Treaty of Rome prohibited ‘quantitative restrictions
on imports and all measures having equivalent effect’ (Art. 30 (28)), although, and this is very
important, this was qualified to allow exemptions from this obligation for a range of public
policy and security issues. We discuss these exemptions in a little more detail below. In
practice one of the key areas of regulation that has affected trade between members states has
been rules governing the placing of products on the market, often for health and safety
reasons, and the testing of products for conformity with those regulations. Barriers to trade
can arise when countries regulate for the same risks but in different ways and when products
must be tested for conformity with each differing set of national rules.
The basic EU approach to this issue of differences in national regulations is the principle of
mutual recognition, which was developed on the basis of European Court of Justice case law,
specifically, the  Cassis de Dijon and  Dassonville judgements. The mutual recognition
approach is based on the idea that products manufactured and tested in accordance with a
partner country’s regulations can offer equivalent levels of protection to those provided by
corresponding domestic rules and procedures. Thus, products produced in partner countries
can be accepted without the need for further agreement with the presumption that they will
not undermine basic regulatory objectives concerning health and safety and so on.
Governments maintain substantial freedom to apply their own rules to domestically produced
products but have to accept products produced to rules stipulated elsewhere. Hence, the
application of the mutual recognition principle requires a degree of trust between different
countries and regulatory authorities that another countries regulations can offer equivalent
levels protection and that such regulations are effectively implemented ensuring that products
actually conform to the requirements of the regulations. The principle of mutual recognition is
the hub of the Single Market since it provides for the free movement of goods (and services,
as we shall discuss later) without the general necessity for regulatory harmonisation.
Despite the basic principles of non-discrimination and free circulation of goods, services
people and capital the EU has always permitted what are deemed as legitimate restrictions on
trade. Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome provides for restrictions on imports for reasons of
‘public policy or public security’ and protection of health as long as such restrictions are not a
disguised restriction on trade. In such cases the onus is on the importing country to
demonstrate that lack of equivalence of regulations is undermining public policies towards,
for example, human health. In practice the European Court of Justice has accepted lack of
equivalence on many occasions and, significantly, has not required conclusive proof of a
threat to human health or other public policies for the refusal to accept a product legally
available elsewhere in the community, accepting in effect that the precautionary principle is
sufficient (Holmes and Young (2001)).
A key element in the application of the principle of mutual recognition has been the
development of mechanisms at the EU level for disciplining national regulations and
interventions into product markets. There are three means by which the EU can affect national
regulations (Pelkmans et al (2000)):
•  Infringement procedures whereby the Commission acts to enforce Community law. These
are important provisions whose existence can have important disciplinary effects and
where case law can establish clear interpretations of relevant statutes. Nevertheless, suchTHE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
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procedures are very time consuming and costly, have an impact only after the event and
are ad hoc in nature. As such they are insufficient to prevent the creation of barriers to free
movement of goods (Pelkmans et al (2000)).
•  Notification procedures whereby member states are required to notify all draft technical
regulations for scrutiny by the 94/34 Committee, whose objective is to prevent new
regulatory barriers to trade. In practice all new national regulations of EU members states
have to pass an EU test regarding their impact on the free movement of goods.
•  Notification of derogation procedures that require member states to notify cases in which
they wish to prevent the sale of goods lawfully produced or marketed in another Member
State on the grounds of non-conformity and non-equivalence with domestic requirements.
This seeks to ensure that any derogation from the principle of mutual recognition is
transparent and subject to scrutiny.
Where it is clear that ‘equivalence’ between levels of regulatory protection embodied in
national regulations cannot be assumed, the EU approach to removing technical barriers to
trade is for the member states to reach agreement on a common set of legally binding
requirements. Subsequently, no further legal impediments can prevent market access of
complying products anywhere in the EU market. EU legislation harmonising technical
specifications has involved two distinct approaches, the ‘old approach’ and the ‘new
approach’.
The old approach mainly applies to products (chemicals, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals and
foodstuffs) by which the nature of the risk requires extensive product-by-product or even
component-by-component legislation and was carried out by means of detailed directives. In
the main achieving this type of harmonisation was slow for two reasons. First, the process of
harmonisation became highly technical, with attention being given to very detailed product
categories including components. This resulted in extensive and drawn-out consultations.
Secondly, the adoption of old approach directives required unanimity in the Council, which
meant that the issuing of directives was a slow process. The limitations of this approach as a
broad tool for tackling technical barriers to trade become clearly apparent in the 1970s and
early 1980s when new national regulations were proliferating at a much faster rate than the
production of European directives harmonising regulations (Pelkmans (1987)).
These weaknesses have been addressed through the adoption of the ‘new approach’ whereby
EU directives only indicate the ‘essential requirements’ that must be satisfied which leaves
greater freedom to manufacturers as to how to satisfy those requirements, dispensing with the
‘old’ type of exhaustively detailed directives. The new approach directives also provide for
more flexibility than the detailed harmonisation directives of the old approach by using the
support of the established standardisation bodies, CEN, CENELEC and the national standard
bodies. New approach directives are adopted by a qualified majority in the Council.
The Single Market and Trade in Services
Application of the principle of mutual recognition also lies at the heart of attempts to integrate
the markets for services in the EU. For certain sectors, such as financial services, negotiated
mutual recognition is a better description since integration is based upon a degree of
regulatory approximation of national prudential requirements together with mutual
recognition of regulatory authority, normally referred to as home country control. The essence
of the system is that the operations of a financial institution throughout the EU, whether
provided across borders or through establishment overseas, is regulated by the government of
the state in which it has its headquarters. In principle such a system should avoid financialPAUL BRENTON
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institutions having to satisfy different regulatory requirements in each of the countries in
which they operate.
However, as in the case of goods, exceptions are permitted to the general requirement of
mutual recognition of services. For example, in the case of financial services the Second
Banking Directive defines that ‘Member States must ensure that there are no obstacles to
carrying on activities receiving mutual recognition in the same manner as in the home
member state, as long as the latter do not conflict with legal provisions protecting the general
good in the host member state’ (see CEC (1997)). The Second Banking Directive does not,
however, provide a definition of the ‘general good’ or stipulate limits or conditions under
which member states can impose ‘general good’ rules on community financial institutions.
Hence in areas without explicit harmonisation at the EU level the definition of the general
good varies between member states and is influenced by national traditions and national
policy objectives. The Court of Justice, through its case law, has specified areas that can be
considered to be in the public good. This open ended list currently comprises: protection of
the recipient of services; protection of workers, including social protection; consumer
protection; preservation of the good reputation of the national financial sector; prevention of
fraud; social order; protection of intellectual property; cultural policy; preservation of national
historical and artistic heritage; cohesion of the tax system; road safety; protection of creditors;
protection of the proper administration of justice (CEC (1997)). National rules adopted in
these areas can be enforced upon a community company based in another member state
provided that the area has not been harmonised at the EU level, that such rules are applied in a
non-discriminatory way, that there is an overriding requirement for them in the general
interest, that they are relevant for attaining the objective for which they are imposed and do
not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective.
It is important to note that financial services do not appear to be subject to the same
notification requirements as goods, where, as noted above all, new technical regulations and
derogations from free movement have to be notified to the Commission. There is no
counterpart to the 98/34 committee for services. Thus, the disciplining effect of notification
and EU level scrutiny of new regulations is absent for services. In addition, for financial
services, companies are often wary of bringing a problem to the attention of the Commission
for fear of undermining their relationship with the regulatory authorities of the country that is
constraining trade. This entails that mutual recognition is likely to be less effective in
removing barriers to trade in services in the EU.
The Single Market in Practice
How effectively is the Single Market working in the current EU of 15 member states? The
European Council has identified the Single Market as being a key element in economic
reform and in achieving the Lisbon objectives. In this context substantial problems remain.
Again, it is useful to examine the goods and services sectors separately. For goods, the New
Approach to harmonised standards at the European level has been undermined by the slow
development and adoption of European standards implementing the agreed minimum
standards under New Approach directives. CEC (2001) reports that CEN (one of the
European Standards Organisations) takes around 8 years to draft and obtain consensus on a
European standard. As a result between April 1998 and May 1999 the European standards
bodies ratified only 40% of the mandated standards and nearly five times as many national
standards were adopted (Holmes and Young (2001)).THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
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The Commission also recognises that there are problems with the application of the principle
of mutual recognition (CEC (2000)) and that these difficulties appear particularly in the new
technology sectors and for complex products. Evidence from businesses suggests that many
firms will still adapt their products to satisfy different technical specifications in other markets
rather than seeking the application of mutual recognition. This reflects, in part, uncertainty
about the effectiveness of the available measures in enforcing mutual recognition and
expectations about the time taken to change the actions of national administrations either
through persuasion or through judicial process. Weak administration and uncertainty by
national administrators leads to a very cautious application of the principle of mutual
recognition. CEC (1999) reports an average length of procedure for cases of infringement of
mutual recognition of 15.5 months for cases initiated between 1996 and 1998. During this
period 228 cases were initiated. According to a survey of industry in 1998 some 80% of
businesses reported that there were still obstacles preventing the full benefits of the Single
Market from being exploited, with differences in standards and technical regulations being
mentioned by 41% of respondents and problems with testing, certification and authorisation
procedures being identified by 34% of the sample (CEC (1999)).
The general view seems to be that obstacles to cross-border trade in services in the EU are
much more substantial than those to trade in goods. Traditional measures of integration, such
as the share of intra-EU trade relative to GDP, provide little clear evidence of an increase in
the intensity of cross-border trade and competition in services in recent years (CEC (2000)).
Trade in financial services in Europe takes place primarily through physical establishment in
another Member State. Mergers and take-overs, rather than cross-border supply, have tended
to be the main vehicle for change in European financial markets.
EU financial markets are undergoing a period of substantial change following the introduction
of the Euro, substantial technological change and regulatory initiatives. Whether these will
combine to generate a genuine single market in financial services and a large European
investment area remains a key issue. A number of important developments have taken place
(Danthine et al (2000), CEC (2001)). A corporate Eurobond market has emerged of
comparable size to that of the dollar market. European firms are increasingly turning to stock
markets for funding via equity issues. EU companies newly admitted to European stock
markets raised twice as much capital in 2000 than in 1999.
Some researchers detect a fundamental change in the nature of European investment
portfolios with an increasing share of foreign equities (Danthine et al (2000)) whilst others
find little evidence that country specific factors have declined in importance in defining
European portfolios (Rouwenhorst (1998)). Heinemann (2002) notes that whilst the market
for investment funds in the EU has been growing strongly, national markets remain
dominated by domestic fund companies. Wojcik (2001) looks at the extent and nature of
cross-border corporate ownership in Europe and concludes that the level of capital market
integration in Europe remains low and that ‘the contours of national borders on the map of the
European capital markets are still very sharp’. These border effects reflect that the conditions
of foreign ownership differ between countries with particular emphasis being placed on the
role of corporate governance.
Enlargement and the Single Market in Europe
Thus, there remain substantial problems within the EU, where there is an extensive
infrastructure, in completing the Single Market. Removing remaining constraints upon the
free movement of goods, services, capital and labour have been put at the heart of the policy
drive to achieve the Lisbon objectives of substantially raising productivity in the EU. Clearly,PAUL BRENTON
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the efforts of the existing members to effectively implement the Single Market must increase
in the context of enlargement since the accession of between 8 and 10 new members will
substantially increase the pressures on the Single Market and stretch the abilities of the
Commission to monitor and ensure compliance with harmonised directives and the principle
of mutual recognition.
The Europe Agreements between the EU and each of the candidate countries in Central and
Eastern Europe provide for the widespread approximation of relevant laws in the CEECs with
EU internal market legislation. These provisions have become of particular importance given
the subsequent drive towards membership of the EU and the requirement that the applicant
countries adopt the legal and institutional framework of the EU,  the  acquis. Thus, the
implementation of EU directives relating to technical regulations has become an essential
element of the accession process.
As part of this process the EU has accepted that the CEECs should be granted sectoral access
to the Single Market prior to accession if the necessary changes to their domestic legislative
systems have been made and implementation of regulations and the EU system of testing and
conformity assessment is deemed to be satisfactory. Even when the relevant EU laws relating
to technical regulations have been adopted in the CEECs, technical barriers will remain if
duplication of conformity assessment procedures persists.
The process of achieving access to the Single Market prior to accession is governed by mutual
recognition agreements called the Protocols on European Conformity Assessment (PECAs).
Following the satisfactory alignment of laws, individual CEECs can negotiate sectoral access
to the Single Market, subject to the technical competence of conformity assessment bodies
being of a level equivalent to that in the EU and the acceptance by both parties of the results
from notified conformity assessment bodies.
The European Commission has concluded agreements with Hungary and the Czech Republic
both of which cover machinery, electrical safety, electromagnetic compatibility, gas
appliances, hot water boilers and good manufacturing practice for medicinal products. The
Hungarian agreement covers in addition good laboratory practice for medicinal products and
medical devices whilst the agreement with the Czech Republic also includes personal
protective equipment and equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. Products
from these sectors that satisfy conformity assessment by any notified body in the EU or the
CEECs will have freedom of movement in the EU and the country concerned. The EU has
also signed a framework agreement, which covers general principles, with Latvia and is
negotiating PECAs with Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia.
The PECAs have primarily been concerned with those sectors where technical regulations
have been harmonised in the EU and have concentrated on New Approach sectors. Thus, the
pre-accession commitments of the CEECs have involved the adoption of EU New Approach
directives and the standards issued by CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. Little or no progress has
been attempted on non-harmonised sectors where the principle of mutual recognition operates
in the EU (CEC (1998)). Hence, for certain products access to the Single Market will only be
delivered, at the earliest, with accession. The basic principle underlying the operation of the
Single Market, that of mutual recognition, will not be applied until after accession, and so
there is no clear means of assessing now how effectively mutual recognition will operate after
enlargement.
This discussion of the EU approach to technical regulations, which is an essential element in
the working of the Single Market, raises a number of issues regarding the post-enlargement
situation and, in particular, the impact that enlargement will have on the Single Market. MostTHE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
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of the applicant countries have made enormous progress in adopting the relevant EU
regulations regarding the placing of products on the market and in upgrading testing and
conformity procedures to similar standards in the EU (precise details for four of the applicant
countries are available in Brenton and Manzocchi (2002)). This is a key element of the pre-
accession process. However, as stressed by Pelkmans et al (2000) the durability of the Single
Market turns on implementation and compliance with Single Market provisions and the
effectiveness of remedies that can be applied in cases of non-compliance.
With regard to the enlargement, we first of all note that the harmonisation process will
become more difficult and probably slower since discussions of minimum technical
requirements will take place amongst 23 to 25 members rather than just 15 with a much
greater variance in incomes, traditions and national policy objectives. Thus, whilst there may
be greater emphasis on the need for new approach directives for a broader range of products
and issues, the ability of the harmonisation procedure and then the standardisation process to
effectively and quickly deliver the necessary standards is at best uncertain. We still do not
have a precise idea of the extent to which the new approach is working to actually remove
technical barriers and stimulate trade between existing member states. Evidence from surveys
of businesses suggest that even in the current EU of 15 substantial barriers to cross-border
trade remain due to the presence of national technical requirements and their application.
Standardisation remains a slow process and cumbersome process which together with the
commitment to reduce the regulatory burden on businesses suggest that increasing emphasis
will have to placed upon application of mutual recognition. On the other hand, the
enlargement of the Union to 25 members and the increase in diversity that this implies is
likely to make general application of the principle of mutual recognition more difficult and
more contested. Administrative capacity is a key element in the application of the principle of
mutual recognition. Although it is important to note that mutual recognition is a principle and
not something that can be directly legislated. CEC (2000) states that ‘Member States must
ensure that appropriate administrative and judicial means exist to enforce Single Market rules
properly, including adequately staffed and trained market surveillance and enforcement
authorities and that adequate means of redress and appropriate sanctions are available and
sufficiently known to economic operators’.
Members require a system that can recognise that equivalent levels of protection are being
offered by the regulatory systems of fellow members. How long it takes to establish such a
system and the preconditions for its effective operation are unclear. What can be said is that
the effective operation of the principle of mutual recognition requires a degree of trust
between regulatory authorities and in the testing systems whose role is to ensure conformity
with the relevant technical requirements. How long it takes to engender such trust is not clear.
Thus, it is very difficult to objectively assess to what extent the applicant countries will be
ready to effectively implement the principle of mutual recognition.
Enlargement and Deeper Integration in Europe
The EU is one of the most integrated groupings of countries in the World. From the outset,
and recently enhanced by the completion of the Single Market, the EU has gone beyond the
simple removal of commercial policy instruments that constrain trade at the border, such as
tariffs and quotas, to address behind the border barriers to trade resulting from the application
of regulatory policies, such as product regulations, environmental regulations, sanitary and
phytosanitary standards, state aids, the protection of intellectual property, and so on.
Nevertheless, the EU is far from a perfectly integrated economic area. For both goods and
services, and financial flows, trade between European countries is quantitatively small relativePAUL BRENTON
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to similar exchanges within national boundaries. In highly integrated markets we should not
be able to detect any impact from national borders, the propensity to trade internationally with
citizens of other countries should be the same as that to trade internally with citizens of the
same country of residence. This is the benchmark of perfect integration. However, in practice
it appears that borders still loom very large (Brenton (2002)).
The crucial issue emanating from this empirical finding is to identify the factors that lie
behind this border effect. In particular, are there impediments which can be broken down,
suggesting that there is considerably more, and much more than we have already experienced,
globalisation to come? Or, can we discern whether there are factors that will always constrain
and limit the extent of global integration? A second issue is whether the removal of such
barriers, if feasible, will lead to the sort of productivity gains that have been achieved from
dismantling formal trade barriers or have the principal gains from trade already been reaped.
In the context of the future of the EU this debate revolves around the issue of whether efforts
towards further integration can contribute to the Lisbon strategy of raising productivity and
competitiveness in Europe.
So what factors could be constraining cross-border integration in Europe. In general, one of
the main reasons for the economic impact of the border is that movement across a national
frontier, even those in the EU where, with the Single Market, there are no border formalities
and only empty border posts, entails movement into a different legal, regulatory, social and
cultural jurisdiction. These borders ‘proscribe, adjudicate and enforce a wide range of norms,
rules, habits, networks and the like’ (Thompson (2000), p4), which differentiate one
geographical area from another, in terms of both consumers preferences but also the legal and
institutional environment for doing business.
More specifically, tastes differ across countries. Domestically located firms will tend to have
better knowledge of local tastes and more generally firms will tend to locate close to markets
to avoid trade costs. This effect will be magnified if intermediate goods producers co-locate
with final goods producers (Hillberry and Hummels (2000)). Even if consumers in different
countries have identical tastes for products they may still have different preferences for the
way that these products are packaged and marketed, which will add to the costs of
international trade. Engel and Rogers (1999) suggest that one of the factors behind the border
effects in consumer prices that they identify in Europe will be differences in national
marketing and distribution systems.
It is also suggested that both consumers and producers tend to have a preference for
purchasing products produced in their own country. Indeed, there is a large literature in the
context of marketing that documents the presence and importance of home bias on the basis of
consumer surveys (see, for example, Knight (1999)). More generally, systematic evidence on
home bias in preferences is sparse. But if home bias in preferences is a genuine phenomenon
and reflects actual desires on the part of consumers then policies that seek to undermine such
bias and to promote further trade are unlikely to be welfare improving.
In this context the application of the principle of mutual recognition plays an important role in
Europe. CEC (1999) argues that the application of mutual recognition is ‘consonant with the
idea of a dynamic approach to the application of  subsidiarity; by avoiding the systematic
creation of detailed rules at Community level, mutual recognition ensures greater observance
of local, regional and national traditions and makes it possible to maintain the diversity of
products and services which come onto the markets’. In short, mutual recognition preserves
the multiformity of tastes and preferences in Europe and allows consumers to effect any bias
towards locally produced products. Detailed harmonisation and, to a lesser extent, theTHE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE EUROPEN ECONOMY
13
specification of minimum standards under the new approach, act to undermine nationally
disparate preferences by reducing the degree of permissible product differentiation and so
suppress diversity.
Thus, although there are clearly additional gains to be had from the more effective
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition in Europe there are limits to the extent
to which this process will increase economic integration. Similarly, Holmes and Young
(2001) argue that a key feature of the EU’s regulatory approach is that progress with market
integration has been possible only by allowing members to pursue their own legitimate public
policy objectives such that a significant degree of variation in rules between members is
permitted. In other words the EU approach of mutual recognition allows national diversity to
be accommodated, to a certain degree. They argue that the EU is reaching a ‘logical
limitation’ in that market integration is only possible if some degree of national variation is
permitted but such variation constrains integration. The further that integration progresses the
more intractable will be the national variations that remain. Thus, on the one hand, mutual
recognition will play a crucial role in an enlarged EU allowing the accession of diverse
countries to the Single Market. On the other hand, by increasing diversity in the Union and
raising the number of legitimate national public policy objectives, enlargement may constrain
the future level of integration in the EU. The immediate priority for the EU after enlargement
will be to ensure that there is not a retrenchment from the current level of integration.
Conclusions
Most discussions of the problems that will arise from the next enlargement focus on the high
profile issues that are related to the level of income in the applicant countries; migration,
agriculture and the budget. However, none of these issues appears to create insurmountable
problems for the current 15 members as a group. The difficulties arise because they are likely
to be significant for some members and not others. Equally relevant is the extent to which
enlargement will affect the ability of the EU to achieve its key objectives. Here we have
briefly considered the impact of enlargement on the integrity of the Single Market and at least
raised the issue of how enlargement will affect the key principle of the Single Market, that of
mutual recognition. If enlargement makes the Single Market less effective through erosion of
this basic principle then the achievement of the Lisbon strategy will be compromised.
In addition, mutual recognition has its limits, in terms of the level of integration that it can
provide for, which in turns has implications for the future direction of the EU. On the one
hand mutual recognition is a powerful tool for undermining barriers to trade in goods and
services whilst avoiding the need for detailed harmonisation and extensive EU level intrusion
into national policy making. On the other hand, mutual recognition preserves a degree of
national differentiation and allows national governments to implement specific policies to
protect ‘the national good’. It is unlikely that the EU could have achieved the level of
integration that it has attained today without the use of the principle of mutual recognition as
the main tool for undermining national segmentation in Europe.
Now EU policy makers want to enhance the Single Market to achieve the bold objectives
defined at Lisbon. Clearly, there is scope to make the Single Market work more effectively.
This is particularly true for the service sectors, where enhanced integration will not only
generate direct economic benefits but will also lead to gains in manufacturing and agricultural
sectors where services are a vital input into modern processes. Nevertheless, there are limits
to the extent that mutual recognition can integrate the markets of different countries. Whether
efforts to increase the effectiveness of mutual recognition will be sufficient, particularly in the
light of enlargement, to achieve the Lisbon objectives remains to be seen.PAUL BRENTON
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